Learning from failures in disaster response

The Myanmar cyclone and Chinese earthquake highlight the need for effective dissemination of information, both before and after a disaster.The effectiveness with which a country deals with a major accident or disaster is a revealing indicator of its sensitivity to the needs of its population. It depends heavily on the country's ability to respond to the population's need for information, prior to and following the event.In the mid-1980s, a key factor in the collapse of the communist regime in the Soviet Union was public resentment of the mishandling of information about the near meltdown at the Chernobyl nuclear plant. It took authorities more than 24 hours to publicly acknowledge the accident, and the lack of evacuation strategies added to losses from the disaster.The recent impact of cyclone Nargis in Myanmar (formerly Burma) and the earthquake in Sichuan province, China, has posed major challenges to both countries in dealing with the event, and handling information about prevention and mitigation.Each has raised important questions about the failure to integrate scientific knowledge into disaster planning, at the cost of thousands of lives. And each has highlighted the need for accurate communication of information, if the impact of major disasters is to be minimised and if government officials are to be held accountable for their efforts — or lack thereof.Clearest lessonIn the case of Myanmar, the failures are glaringly obvious.Firstly, there has been the failure to take on board increasingly widespread knowledge about how the destruction of mangrove forests dramatically increases the vulnerability of coastal populations.This was one of the clearest lessons of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami and has been acknowledged in other countries, including Bangladesh. But Myanmar authorities seem to have paid little attention to mangrove conservation. UN Food and Agriculture Organization officials say the Irrawaddy delta — the country's largest mangrove area, where Nargis struck — has lost half its mangrove area since 1975 (see UN: Mangrove loss 'intensified' Myanmar cyclone damage).Secondly, it is clear that the country lacks the comprehensive communication infrastructure — and perhaps even the political will — to ensure that information about impending disasters reaches the areas where it is most needed.Warnings about the imminent cyclone were posted by the country's meteorological office. But there was no way of rapidly communicating these warnings to those most in danger. Furthermore, the lack of protection measures meant that even those aware could do little about it.Widespread praiseIn China, the situation has been different. The government has won widespread praise for the speed with which it has acknowledged the size of the disaster and submitted its rescue efforts to international scrutiny — in stark contrast to the Tangshan earthquakes of 1976.This new attitude has been reflected in the willingness of earthquake specialists to open themselves up to queries from local journalists. In the past, they would have insisted that all such questions be directed to government officials. Through a fortunate accident of timing, a new law on public access to information came into effect on 1 May, requiring them to act differently. But even in China, important questions have been raised.For example, there is no guarantee that the scientists who have made themselves accessible in an emergency situation will maintain this attitude in less urgent times. In addition to their willingness to deal with the media, scientific institutions must be trained to release information in a fast and comprehensible way.At the same time, media reporting on baseless rumours of new earthquake shocks has reinforced the need to train science journalists to make their own judgments about when to trust apparently scientific statements.Equally important is the need for some probing journalism into why so many schools collapsed, particularly when buildings around them often remained standing. In many cases, the problems appear to have been caused not by a lack of scientific or technical information, but by a failure to put information to use.Intense pressureIncreased openness is not without cost. The more the Soviet government unveiled information about the Chernobyl disaster, the greater became the criticism of its failure to protect its citizens.Undoubtedly, this fear lies at the heart of the situation in Myanmar. The sight on state-run television of the country's prime minister visiting a few hastily erected camps for survivors — all looking remarkably well-fed — is far less likely to generate internal criticism than film of bloated bodies and starving children almost three weeks after the cyclone.In the long-term, attempts to impose heavy-handed restrictions on the coverage of disasters, particularly in an era of global electronic communication, will inevitably be counterproductive. As they learn more about the reality of the situation, the less confidence they will have in those who tell them that the situation is different.Providing citizens with the information they need to protect themselves against future cyclones or earthquakes is a crucial role for science communicators. Identifying the political or other obstacles that prevent this information from getting through or being put into practice is potentially even more important.

Source: http://www.scidev.net/en/editorials/learning-from-failures-in-disaster-response.html

NGOS IN AFRICA

JOHANNESBURG:
'Let's have a test," challenged a colleague recently in Rwanda, "as to what NGO Landcruiser next arrives in the parking lot. "It was no joke. The parking lot of any upmarket restaurant in any African capital speaks volumes about the neo-imperial game being played out in Africa.
Four-wheel-drive after four-wheel-drive emblazoned with the logo of some donor agency or children's charity jostle for space.

The humanitarians are not hard to spot in person either. Usually white, generally loud, they prefer a shabby-chic uniform of T-shirt, jeans and sandals. But they are more powerful and usually less benign than they appear.

Sitting recently in the Café Bourbon in the smart, new shopping precinct of Kigali opened my eyes (and ears) to some of the implications. "We must just transfer the $8.5 million," rasped the American working for a prominent NGO.

Such money grants them considerable power and influence. The average Rwandan earns $240 per year. The government's annual budget is $650 million. Recent events in Chad over alleged orphan smuggling by an NGO illustrate if nothing else the degree of suspicion such relative power produces. Those sympathetic to the (mostly) young people performing humanitarian roles in Africa argue that they bring much needed skills to deprived Africans. The defense normally adds that they are giving up promising careers and suffering hardship in doing so. What they don't emphasize is the less obvious harm they do. Those previously rendering imperial service suffered hardship, disease and violence. There were no emergency medevacs then, no media to dramatize their service, and no pop stars to campaign on their behalf. And even if these forefathers and mothers promoted polices politically distasteful today, they were more accountable than those in this new quasi-colonial service. The imperial agents of old had at least to answer to parliaments and taxpayers, not self-appointed boards of self-important thought-leaders. But this is not the worst of it. Recently Paris Hilton announced that she was going to be really brave and travel to Rwanda. "I'm scared, yeah," she said. "I've heard it's really dangerous. I've never been on a trip like this before. "She was reportedly planning to "leave her mark" - just like many others before her, supposedly helping Africa while helping themselves. Once there she might have considered a visit to the local Millennium Development Village, an idea to help Africa formulated by the Columbia professor Jeffrey Sachs. Celebrity airhead might meet celebrity economist.

Explaining what motivated her trip, Paris said "There's so much need in that area, and I feel like if I go, it will bring more attention to what people can do to help." If it eventually happens, hopefully the hotel heiress' visit (now officially rescheduled) will be more successful than the village concept by which Sachs wanted to prove his theory that if you give a small unit enough resources then the inhabitants will prosper, a micro-prototype to the "more aid equals African development" thesis. The cost of the "services" rendered by such foreigners is, as ever, borne by Africans. Their actions, fundraising techniques and prominence strengthen the perception that Africa is unable to help itself - both inside and, especially given foreign NGO funding requirements, outside the country. It perpetuates perceptions of helplessness and a victim mentality. At a time when many have realized that African development depends on Africans determining their own policies and making those choices, such actions transfer power and emphasis away from the continent's decision-makers.

Portraying Africa as an object of pity also ignores the very real progress the continent - now in its fourth straight year of six percent GDP growth - has made in ending conflict and raising living standards. What Africa needs is extraordinary economic growth, not extraordinary pity. That is why eventually Africa will tire of this new generation of imperialists, just as it rejected the last lot.

Greg Mills heads the Johannesburg-based Brenthurst Foundation.

Source: http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/02/opinion/edmills.php

Humanitarian Assistance Often Lacks Needs Assessment

ScienceDaily (Nov. 10, 2007) — The first academic thesis in Sweden on international health assistance in disaster zones is to be presented at the medical university Karolinska Institutet. In his thesis, Dr Johan von Schreeb shows that international assistance is often sent to disaster areas without any prior needs assessment having been made of the affected population.

Dr von Schreeb has carried out needs assessments in a number of disaster situations. He examined the need for international medical assistance after the terrorist action in a school in Beslan, Russia, in 2004, and the low-intensity conflict in the Palestinian territories in 2002. He also studied the use of Foreign Field Hospitals in the natural (sudden impact) disaster zones of Bam (Iran) in 2003, Haiti and Aceh (Indonesia) in 2004 and Pakistan (Kashmir) 2005).

What he discovered was a lack of understanding of people's needs subsequent to the disaster and that international assistance takes inadequate account of existing resources. International field hospitals specialising in life-saving trauma care were dispatched to four areas of natural disaster. Not one arrived within the 48 hours in which lives could still be saved.

If appropriate assistance is to be provided, organisers need access to information about the disaster, the affected area, the size of the population, the socio-economic situation and the available local and regional resources. International donors of humanitarian assistance have jointly decided to distribute the money on the basis of local needs.

There are well-described methods of making needs assessments, but the results are too rarely used. One of Dr von Schreeb's sub-studies examined the extent to which Sida took account of needs assessments in its decisions to fund humanitarian health projects in 2003. Only one third of these decisions contained information about the size of the population to be helped or other factors reflecting their health needs. "My interpretation of this is that it's difficult to provide funding on the basis of needs," says Dr von Schreeb. "Other procedures are needed for having needs govern funding decisions."

During his time as medical coordinator for Medecins Sans Frontieres (Doctors without Borders) in Kashmir, Dr von Schreeb was able to test a new rapid method of gathering needs assessment data in a disaster area. After the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, he interviewed people at health facilities. His interviewees were geographically representative of the studied population, and the early estimated death and injury toll compared well with the results of a later study in which everyone living in the area was interviewed. "The interviews gave a good, immediate idea of what people needed -- in this case to have their houses repaired before the winter," says Dr von Schreeb.

Thesis: Needs assessments for international humanitarian health assistance in disasters, Johan von Schreeb, Department of Public Health Science, Karolinska Institutet
The public defence of this thesis will be taking place on 23 November 2007 at Karolinska Institutet Campus Solna, Stockholm.

Source: http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/11/071109101759.htm